Democracy in Somaliland by Walls, M
1     Education and Conflict Review Issue 1
Education and 
Conflict Review
Education, Peace and Development in Somali Society
Edited by
Tejendra Pherali and
Alexandra Lewis
Centre for Education and International Development 
UCL Institute of Education
2     Education and Conflict Review Issue 1
Democracy in Somaliland
Michael Walls 
1 For more on these processes, see Walls, M., 2014, A Somali Nation-State: History, culture and Somaliland’s political transition (2nd Edition), 
(Pisa: Ponte Invisibile/redsea-online)
Development Planning Unit (DPU), University College London
The critical debates connecting democracy, governance 
and peace-building revolve around a cyclically shifting set 
of questions. If we locate those questions in the context 
of ‘development’ and state formation, they relate to the 
different forms of democracy, the options available for 
balancing leadership and clear decision-making against wider 
participation and the related but different dilemmas around 
stability, legitimacy and representation within nation-states.
To put that more plainly, much discussion centres on the 
relative merits of developmental state models, which tend to 
involve a strong leadership, directing ‘development’ at the 
cost of human rights and popular participation. These are 
contrasted against highly participatory systems that tend 
to offer great ‘legitimacy’ through freedom of speech and 
association on the one hand, but which also have a tendency 
to short- and sometimes long-term instability on the other. 
That’s a gross over-simplification, of course, complicated for 
one thing by the fact that the equation tends to change over 
time - as institutions solidify. It is often possible to shift from a 
system of stronger leadership to one of greater participation.
The time element makes these trade-offs particularly 
pertinent in the world of ‘development’, where nascent 
states face the immediate issues of security and stability, 
without which greater participation may prove impossible. 
There is, of course, nothing ‘natural’ about the nation-state in 
which stable and participatory processes must, perforce, be 
delivered. Meanwhile, the donors who frequently play such a 
strong role in supporting the process often forget that, in their 
own countries, the institutions of state were consolidated over 
extended periods involving battles as bitter and protracted 
as any that they are now witnessing in the countries in which 
they find themselves working.
The Somali experience offers particularly pertinent lessons 
on all of these points. Somali society is traditionally highly 
egalitarian (at least for men from dominant clans), boasting 
discursive traditions that offer adult males remarkable input 
into how their communities are governed. While donors 
call for ‘democratisation’, many Somalis see the shift to 
representative democracy as a process of democratic 
diminishment. Customary channels for participation are 
closed in favour of representative systems that rely on 
election rather than discourse, and where many feel keenly 
the loss of power as politicians move from their constituent 
bases to capital cities to conduct their politics, in many 
cases failing to return regularly, or sometimes at all, to the 
constituents whom they are meant to represent.1
Of course, these patterns have led to long-term state failure in 
what is now meant to be federal Somalia. However, it is in the 
still-internationally unrecognised northern state of Somaliland 
where that shift to representative, electoral politics has gone 
the furthest. Often held up as a corrective to the narrative of 
state failure in the south, Somaliland’s progress has indeed 
been remarkable. Since their declaration of independent 
sovereignty in 1991, Somaliland has held a large number of 
peace meetings and conferences, following a cyclical pattern 
designed to address local sub-clan grievances first, before 
progressing to more forward-looking issues of governance, 
and eventually to state building itself. Those conferences 
continue to the present day, and offer a formal, customary 
structure for the continuation of the discursive traditions that 
have existed for centuries. They have also made possible a 
series of elections, starting with a constitutional referendum 
in 2001, and continuing since then to elect the president and 
local government (twice each), and, in 2005, the lower house 
of parliament.
In navigating a way along that path, Somaliland have had to 
address a number of challenges related to the anything-but 
theoretical concerns outlined above. Elections have frequently 
been delayed as compromises have been hammered out 
between clan groups, employing discursive methods to 
find common ground. That combination of discourse and 
election has led some to describe the Somaliland state as 
‘hybrid’ (Boege et al. 2008; Walls & Kibble 2010). While that 
description is valid in many respects, it is also important to 
recognise just how messy that process is. For outsiders, it 
has often appeared frustratingly slow, corrupt and crisis-
ridden (Crisis Group 2009). Many of the problems that 
Somaliland faces are deeply-felt and completely legitimate. 
The decision at one of the big clan conferences in 1993 to go 
with a strong presidential system with a parliament offering 
only moderate checks on executive power was hard-argued 
at the time and continues to generate considerable debate. 
It relates clearly to the trade-off, referenced above, between 
leadership and participation.
Customary channels for participation are closed in 
favour of representative systems that rely on election 
rather than discourse, and where many feel keenly the 
loss of power as politicians move from their constituent 
bases to capital cities to conduct their politics, in many 
cases failing to return regularly, or sometimes at all, to 
the constituents whom they are meant to represent.
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At the same time, the greater troubles experienced in 
Somalia to the south, where everything - crisis, international 
involvement, clan division, conflict - seem to exist on a 
grander and therefore more intractable scale, serve as a 
potent reminder of the value of Somaliland’s stability. That has 
led to an often grudging, though so far durable, acceptance 
of the compromises made to date.
The future has always looked uncertain - that’s more 
or less a truism given the dynamic nature of evolving 
institutions and the debates that underpin that evolution. 
Somaliland is currently just about finished with a process 
of registering voters. It’s only the second time voters have 
been systematically registered, with the last giving rise 
to the 2009 crisis referred to above. Voter registration is 
concluding against a backdrop in which discussions between 
the Somaliland government and the Dhulbahante sub-clans, 
who traditionally inhabit the eastern region of Sool, seem to 
be making genuine progress. Some prominent Dhulbahante 
elders were active participants in the initial meetings that led 
to the consolidation of an autonomous Somaliland state in 
the early 1990s. However, since then, the Dhulbahante have 
drifted away from Somaliland, marginalised by the internecine 
politics of the dominant Isaaq clans, of which they were not 
a part. Undecided as to whether their best prospects lay with 
Puntland, further to the east, with the as-yet fragile federal 
government in the south, or with Somaliland, Dhulbahante 
groups formed different alliances, including the Khaatumo 
federal state who mounted an armed resistance against both 
immediate neighbours, Somaliland and Puntland.
The current talks are between Khaatumo and Somaliland 
and, if they succeed, will bring Khaatumo into the 
Somaliland government. Somaliland would be able to claim 
broad acceptance within the old British colonial borders, 
and Khaatumo will have direct input into local politics. 
Pragmatically, it would also boost the governing party’s 
chances of success in presidential elections due to take place 
in March 2017.
It is rightly impossible to separate the day to day detail from 
the more conceptual concerns outlined at the start of this 
article. The struggles and debates touched on so briefly 
here are illustrative of precisely those changing trade-offs 
between stability and participation; between representative 
decision-making and its distant discursive cousin. Future 
research must continue to seek a better understanding of the 
societal processes that lie behind the decisions made. The 
transition so far has tended to consolidate the political power 
of customarily dominant groups - namely the main clans and 
men. Women and minority clans consequently face significant 
practical hurdles that, although often discussed, remain 
relatively misunderstood. More research in those areas could 
contribute significantly to the ability to support meaningful 
progress in redressing the imbalance.
Critically and often inconveniently, better understanding must 
be rooted in a deep contextual understanding of the myriad 
variables that affect the process. Somaliland offers a richly 
rewarding case for combining contextual and theoretical 
perspectives. As does Somalia in its various parts. However, 
while each case must be considered in the light of its 
neighbours, each is also distinct.
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Berbera, Somaliland: The voter registration process
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